

# CONTENTS

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<i>Preface</i>	<i>xix</i>
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>xxiii</i>
<b>PART I: INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter 1: Toward a Conceptual Approach to Negotiation</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>A. The Steps of Negotiation: An Overview</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1. Preparation</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>2. Information Exchange</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>3. Agreement Proposals</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>4. Resolution</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>B. Conceptual Models of Negotiation</b>	<b>12</b>
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, <i>Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving</i>	<b>14</b>
Russell Korobkin, <i>A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation</i>	<b>17</b>
Robert H. Mnookin, <i>Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict</i>	<b>20</b>
Discussion Questions and Problems	<b>23</b>
<b>PART II: THE STRUCTURE OF NEGOTIATION</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Chapter 2: Estimating the Bargaining Zone</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>A. Batnas and Reservation Prices</b>	<b>27</b>
Russell Korobkin, <i>A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation</i>	<b>27</b>
Notes	<b>30</b>
<b>B. Calculating Reservation Price: A Prescriptive Approach</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>1. Step 1: The Baseline</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>2. Step 2: Adjusting from the Baseline</b>	<b>32</b>
Notes	<b>38</b>
Discussion Questions and Problems	<b>46</b>
<b>Chapter 3: Psychological Factors in Evaluating Alternatives</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>A. Heuristics</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>1. The Self-Serving Bias</b>	<b>53</b>

George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, <i>Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining</i>	53
<b>2. Overweighting of Salient Information</b>	56
Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, <i>Forecasting Trial Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher Probability to Possibilities That Are Described in Greater Detail</i>	57
<b>3. Anchoring and Adjustment</b>	59
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, <i>Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach</i>	60
<b>4. Reactive Devaluation</b>	62
Lee Ross, <i>Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution</i>	63
Notes	66
<b>B. Attribution Biases</b>	70
Russell Korobkin, <i>Psychological Barriers to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice</i>	70
Notes	73
<b>C. Prospect Theory and Reference Point Effects</b>	74
<b>1. Loss Aversion</b>	74
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, <i>Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem</i>	75
Russell Korobkin, <i>Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms</i>	78
<b>2. The Framing Effect</b>	81
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, <i>Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation</i>	81
Notes	85
Discussion Questions and Problems	88
<b>Chapter 4: Integrative Bargaining</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>A. The Role of Differences</b>	91
David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, <i>The Manager as Negotiator</i>	94
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, <i>The Limits of Integrative Bargaining</i>	99
Notes	103
<b>B. Frameworks for Identifying integrative Opportunities</b>	106
<b>1. Focusing on Core Interests Rather than Positions</b>	106
Roger Fisher, William Ury & Bruce Patton, <i>Getting to Yes</i>	106
<b>2. Changing the Contents of Negotiation “Packages”</b>	109
Notes	112
<b>C. Sources of Integrative Value in Legal Transactions</b>	117
<b>1. Adverse Selection</b>	117
<b>2. Moral Hazard</b>	118
<b>3. Uncertainty</b>	120
Notes	121
Discussion Questions and Problems	122

<b>Chapter 5: Power</b>	<b>127</b>
<b>A. Changing The Bargaining Zone</b>	130
<b>B. Manipulating Perceptions of The Bargaining Zone</b>	134
Russell Korobkin, <i>A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation</i>	135
Notes	139
<b>C. Commitments</b>	141
Thomas Schelling, <i>The Strategy of Conflict</i>	142
Notes	145
<b>D. Patience</b>	148
1. The Cost of Lost Time	149
2. The Cost of Negotiating	150
Notes	150
<b>E. The Pitfalls of Power</b>	152
1. Miscalculation of the Bargaining Zone Can Lead to Impasse	152
2. Claims of Disinterest Might Not Be Credible	152
3. Power Tactics Can Produce an Emotional Response that Leads to Impasse	153
4. Power Tactics Can Negatively Affect Relationships and Reputations	154
5. Power Tactics Can Affect Performance of Agreements	154
Notes	155
Discussion Questions and Problems	156
<b>Chapter 6: Fair Division and Related Social Norms</b>	<b>159</b>
<b>A. Meta-norms of Distributive Justice</b>	161
Notes	162
<b>B. Convention</b>	165
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, <i>Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market</i>	166
Roger Fisher, William Ury & Bruce Patton, <i>Getting to Yes</i>	171
Steven Lubet, <i>Notes on the Bedouin Horse Trade or "Why Won't the Market Clear, Daddy?"</i>	173
Notes	174
<b>C. Reciprocity As A Process Norm</b>	176
Robert B. Cialdini, <i>Influence: Science and Practice</i>	176
Notes	181
<b>D. Combining Fair Division with Integration</b>	184
Discussion Questions and Problems	188

<b>PART III: THE NEGOTIATOR</b>	<b>191</b>
<b>Chapter 7: Interpersonal Obstacles to Optimal Agreements</b>	<b>193</b>
<b>A. Trust and The Negotiator's Dilemma</b>	193
1. The Prisoner's Dilemma as Metaphor	194
2. The Negotiator's Dilemma	195
David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, <i>The Manager as Negotiator</i>	195
3. The Potential for Trust	198
4. The Importance of Social Context	201
Robert Axelrod, <i>The Evolution of Cooperation</i>	204
Notes	208
<b>B. The Role of Emotions in Bargaining</b>	211
1. The Desire for Interactional Justice	211
2. Incidental Emotions and Affect	213
3. Creating Helpful Emotional States	214
Notes	218
Discussion Questions and Problems	219
<b>Chapter 8: Negotiator Style</b>	<b>223</b>
<b>A. Conflict Orientation</b>	223
1. Cooperation Versus Competition	224
Gerald R. Williams, <i>Legal Negotiation and Settlement</i>	224
2. Empathy Versus Assertiveness	228
Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet & Andrew S. Tulumello, <i>The Tension Between Empathy and Assertiveness</i>	228
Notes	230
<b>B. Aspiration Levels</b>	232
Russell Korobkin, <i>Aspirations and Settlement</i>	234
Notes	239
Discussion Questions and Problems	241
<b>Chapter 9: Group Membership</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>A. Gender</b>	246
Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, <i>Women Don't Ask:         Negotiation and the Gender Divide</i>	246
Notes	250
<b>B. Culture</b>	256
Jeanne M. Brett, <i>Culture and Negotiation</i>	258
Jeswald W. Salacuse, <i>Making Deals in Strange Places:         A Beginner's Guide to International Business Negotiations</i>	262
Michele J. Gelfand & Sophia Christakopoulou, <i>Culture         and Negotiator Cognition: Judgment Accuracy and Negotiation         Processes in Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures</i>	265

Contents	xv
Notes	268
Discussion Questions and Problems	272
<b>PART IV: ADDITIONAL PARTIES</b>	<b>275</b>
<b>Chapter 10: The Principal-Agent Relationship</b>	<b>277</b>
<b>A. The Benefits of Lawyer-Agents</b>	<b>277</b>
1. Technical Expertise	277
2. Negotiation Expertise	278
3. Signaling	278
4. Dispassionate Analysis	278
5. Justification Generation	279
6. Access	279
7. Strategic Advantage	279
8. Cost Effectiveness	280
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, <i>Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation</i>	280
Ronald J. Gilson, <i>Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing</i>	284
Notes	288
<b>B. The Principal-Agent Tension</b>	<b>289</b>
1. Different Preferences	290
2. Different Interests	290
3. Different Personalities	291
4. Expense	292
Evans v. Jeff D.	292
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, <i>Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer</i>	295
Notes	297
Discussion Questions and Problems	302
<b>Chapter 11: Multilateral Negotiations</b>	<b>307</b>
<b>A. Coalition Formation</b>	<b>308</b>
1. The Problem of Unstable BATNAs	308
2. Power Dynamics: Whether to Join a Coalition	309
3. Building Coalitions	311
James K. Sebenius, <i>Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First?</i>	312
Notes	316
<b>B. Fair Division</b>	<b>317</b>
<b>C. Managing Communication</b>	<b>319</b>
Howard Raiffa with John Richardson & David Metcalf,	

<i>Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of Collaborative Decision Making</i>	319
Donald G. Gifford, <i>Legal Negotiation: Theory and Applications</i>	323
Notes	325
Discussion Questions and Problems	326
<b>Chapter 12: The Use of Mediation in Negotiation</b>	<b>329</b>
<b>A. The Potential Benefits of Mediation</b>	331
1. Facilitate Introspection and Analysis	331
2. Facilitate Communication	332
3. Evaluate Issues Relevant to the Parties' Reservation Prices	333
4. Filter Private Information	334
5. Create Focal Points	336
6. Reduce Reactive Devaluation	337
7. Deter Extreme Distributive Tactics	338
8. Help Negotiators Save Face	338
Notes	339
<b>B. Mediator Strategies</b>	340
Leonard L. Riskin, <i>Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed</i>	341
Christopher W. Moore, <i>The Caucus: Private Meetings That Promote Settlement</i>	347
Notes	351
<b>C. Transactional Mediation</b>	353
Scott R. Peppet, <i>Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We Use Mediators in Deals?</i>	353
Notes	356
Discussion Questions and Problems	357
<b>PART V: THE LAW OF NEGOTIATION</b>	<b>359</b>
<b>Chapter 13: Deceit</b>	<b>361</b>
<b>A. Representations About The Negotiation's Subject Matter</b>	363
Vulcan Metals Co. Inc. v. Simmons Manufacturing Co., Inc.	363
Notes	364
<b>B. Representations Related To The Speaker's Reservation Price</b>	368
Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Building Corp.	368
Notes	370
<b>C. Nondisclosure</b>	372
Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank	372

Contents	<b>xvii</b>
Weintraub v. Krobatsch	373
V.S.H. Realty v. Texaco	375
Notes	377
<b>D. Sanctions for Deceit</b>	<b>379</b>
Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell	379
Notes	381
<b>E. Misrepresenting The Objective: “bad Faith” Negotiation</b>	<b>382</b>
Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp.	383
Notes	385
<b>F. The Ethics of Misrepresentation</b>	<b>387</b>
James J. White, <i>Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation</i>	387
Charles B. Craver, <i>Negotiation Ethics: How to Be Deceptive Without Being Dishonest/How to Be Assertive Without Being Offensive</i>	388
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, <i>The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations</i>	390
Reed Elizabeth Loder, <i>Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator</i>	391
Notes	393
Discuss Questions and Problems	394
<b>Chapter 14: Rules Encouraging Litigation Settlement</b>	<b>399</b>
<b>A. Fee Shifting and “offer of Settlement” Rules</b>	<b>399</b>
Edward F. Sherman, <i>From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice</i>	400
Notes	403
<b>B. Judicial Settlement Conferences</b>	<b>406</b>
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure	406
In re Novak	407
Notes	411
Nick v. Morgan’s Foods, Inc.	413
Notes	415
<b>C. Inadmissibility of Settlement Negotiations</b>	<b>417</b>
Federal Rules of Evidence	418
Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility	418
Affiliated Manufacturers, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America	419
Notes	422
Discussion Questions and Problems	423
<b>Chapter 15: Limitations on Settlement</b>	<b>425</b>
<b>A. Judicial Review of Settlements</b>	<b>425</b>
1. Power Imbalances	425

Lewis v. Lewis	426
<b>2. Principal-Agent Conflicts</b>	427
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois National Bank	428
<b>3. Protecting the Public Interest</b>	431
United States v. Microsoft Corp.	431
<b>B. Settlement in Multiple-defendant Litigation</b>	434
Elbaor v. Smith	435
Notes	437
Discussion Questions and Problems	437
<i>Table of Cases</i>	441
<i>Collected References</i>	443
<i>Index</i>	449